

Perspectives On Asean Security: From Post-Wwii Era 1945 To Aec Establishment In 2015

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ABSTRACT

This study hopes to make a modest contribution towards the analysis of Southeast Asian regional security since 1945. By using documentary research, the study examined the evolving regional security dynamics and the consequent actions and behavior of various member states and the external powers. Firstly, the two scholarly approaches were chosen for their insights into how states interact and seek to promote their material interests; the balance of power approach, derived from realist/neorealist theories, set the tone with its compelling argument that in an anarchic world order, states remain wary of each other and cooperate only because they have to; the institutional approach, derived from neoliberal theories, provided its equally compelling counterpoint argument that cooperation requires rules, and in creating institutions to facilitate these rules, states find that they could cooperate iteratively. Together, these two approaches provide insights into the tensions between conflict and cooperation under anarchy, whether at the systemic or sub-systemic (regional) level. Nevertheless, there are inherent limitations in both approaches in their logical explanation of regional security analysis, especially since the end of the Cold War, hence the comprehensive security was therefore introduced. Comprehensive security concept was usually applied to identify the often-complicated local dynamics and networking relations in regional systems (and sub-systems) and provides explanatory accounts in situations where the security policies among ASEAN members were diverged. Perspectives from these three approaches will not only lead to a better understanding of Southeast Asia's regional security during the emergence of ASEAN institution, but it also could potentially help ASEAN countries overcome the obstacles in building the strong sense of security as a community, today and in the future.

Keywords: ASEAN, Security Regime, Regional Security

INTRODUCTION

45 years after signing Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN scholars have been regularly disappointed with the delays of institutional development of the region. Accordingly, ASEAN thus often been criticized on "The implementation deficit", which refers to the problem that most of the ASEAN nations failed to implement various regional conventions that have been signed, especially the ones involved in national security and material interests, and regularly seek conflict settlement bilaterally or with help from external countries, such as the US, or external institutions, such as UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instead of using ASEAN; for example, Preah Vihear dispute between Thailand and Cambodia that both countries have seek help from ICJ before mutually agree on seeking bilateral arrangements, and the case of territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sipadan that both countries have also asked ICJ to resolve the issue without bringing it up in any ASEAN summit.

The differences in cultures, language, political behaviors and the past or even the current conflicts have helped ASEAN countries preserve the sense of nationalism that intensify the notions of national identity instead of the creating of ASEAN regional identity. Nevertheless, ASEAN still strongly intend to become a community, particularly towards AEC which was established in 2015. For International Relations scholars, therefore, the explanation for such efforts making by the ASEAN members then should be clarified– which approach can be best

in describing this effort? And how did the security dynamics in ASEAN have changed and will change? With these questions, this study will seek to identify and examine the changing security dynamics in ASEAN from post WW2 era 1945 to AEC establishment in 2015 by deploying three different International Relations perspectives. It aims at not only to gain the better understanding towards the emergent of ASEAN, but also to offer the most appropriate approach in security analysis that could be helpful for ASEAN countries when producing national security policies.

The research methodology using in this study is documentary research attempting to integrate empirical research and evidence gathered for the purpose of explaining the phenomena. On this basis, each approach will then be examined for their insights, strengths, and weaknesses, in explaining how states interact to promote their interests and how tensions between conflict and cooperation under anarchy, whether at the systemic or sub-systemic (regional) level, are formed in each period of time;

First, the period of 1945-1975 when no regional system of states could be said to have existed in Southeast Asia, the most suitable approach explaining the Southeast Asians states' behavior is the balance of power approach. The introduction of the Cold War into Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, saw an increasing American military presence in the region, as well as the advent of a proxy war in combination with a local war in Indochina. The direct power balancing strategy of the United States then led to the countervailing power from within and outside the region. The main strength of the balance of power approach in explaining Southeast Asia security dynamic under this period is the fact that states was widely use a threat of military force to counter- balance internal and external powers. For example, there were cases of Indonesia trying to dominate mainland ASEAN, as well as the communism expansion from Vietnam. Furthermore, although the balance of power approach was failed to explain the beginnings of Southeast Asian regionalism in the late 1960s, which led to the inception of ASEAN in 1967, it was until 1975 that the Southeast Asian people could really benefit from the changing notion among ASEAN members towards their security orientations.

Second, the period of 1975-1991, when the more mature Southeast Asian regional system developed, the dramatic changes from the withdrawal of American troops in Southeast Asia had also posted the new challenge, in terms of for stability, in the region. On this basis, therefore, deploying the balance of power approach alone cannot accurately explain the regional security dynamic anymore. Despite there were some confirmations of the balance of power's explanatory power, there also were the cohesive behaviors among ASEAN states. For example, ASEAN worked together as a diplomatic community and proved that it could constitute interests on behalf of one of its founding members, Thailand, when it comes to dealing with the situation of the Vietnam offensive behavior to take Cambodia. Indeed, it was the incident that finally led to ASEAN's agreement on the famous ASEAN's limited regionalism. In this sense, the institutional approach thus has to be taken into account when analyze ASEAN security dynamic as well.

Third, the period of post-cold war, 1991- 2015, when AEC is officially established, Southeast Asia was now clearly linked to the other constituent parts of the world. In this era, the end of the Cold War and the impact of globalization prevailed. Balancing behavior has not been strongly manifested. At same time, newly independent regional states, which had little in common and therefore had great difficulty cooperating on security issues on the basis of a common regional order. This means the more complicated ASEAN now cannot be analyzed using only classical approaches deployed in earlier period. Subsequently, a third idea specifically focused on post-Cold War ASEAN regional security analysis was therefore

introduced: the comprehensive security, an analytical device that identifies the often-complicated local dynamics and networking relations in regional systems (and sub-systems) and provides explanatory accounts in situations where the security policies among ASEAN members have diverged.

Furthermore, the impact of economic liberalization, globalization, environmental awareness, human rights notion, and particularly the 1997 financial crisis etc., brought about the changing notion of security among ASEAN states. ASEAN leaders begun to identify the non-traditional security threats such as people, drug and weapon smuggling, organized crime, the spread of mass diseases, terrorism or environmental degradation along with political and military stability. In short, after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN and Asia-Pacific have expanded and have seen a resurgence of formal institution-creation in both the security and economic arenas. Some prominent examples include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for the former; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for the latter. ASEAN members have been active in promoting these institutions. However, this does not mean that balancing behavior among the major powers will not return. The Asia-Pacific, in such periods, may yet be ripe for rivalry.

FINDINGS

Southeast Asia and the Cold War Settings

Southeast Asia, the region known of diversity in ethnics and rich in resources, while bounded by the major Asian powers of China to the north and India to the northwest (Jawhar, 1991), had been geographically insulated from the Western powers by the great Pacific Ocean. However, the era of European colonization eventually ended Southeast Asia's maritime insulation from the West and wrought changes to historical patterns of security relations which continue to be felt– and intensified– by the creation of modern territorially based “nation-states” (San, 1999). The colonization of Southeast Asia by various European powers, i.e., Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and Great Britain led to the imposition of territorial boundaries that served as the bases for local elites to establish the post-Second World War states of Southeast Asia. Then, after the Second World War the Cold War, coincided with various independence movements and struggles for statehood in the region, had brought the United States-Soviet Union superpower rivalry into Southeast Asia. But unlike the tight bipolar rivalry in Europe, the Asian contest was more fluid, as it involved the considerable “China factor” (Jawhar, 1991).

Thus, given the internal and external constraints, the immediate postwar Southeast Asia did not have the prerogative of gradually evolving a regional order shaped by mutually agreed norms and rules acceptable to the external powers. Instead, it was pulled into the global Cold War while the colonial legacy was still leaving behind ruptured regional entities in uneven stages of state-formation that heightening the antagonistic relationships in the region. Southeast Asian leaders were then subjected to internal stresses and interest group demands as well as external impositions and inducements throughout the Cold War period (Cohen, 1981). In this sense, given historical experiences, domestic politics and divergent perceptions of the external powers early became part of the strategic cultures among regional leaders. Equally, it also means that the interests and rivalries of powerful external powers, which interacted with the interests and rivalries of weak regional powers, had become a crucial factor in determining the Southeast Asian regional order and identity.

ASEAN's formative years and the formative “Rules of the Game”

Fortunately, despite the internal and external tensions, the formation of “institutional survival” in Southeast Asia emerged (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982). Fortunately, despite the internal

and external tensions, the formation of “institutional survival” in Southeast Asia emerged. On August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was formally established by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Since then, membership has expanded to include Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and thus truly become the association of Southeast Asian states (Leifer, 1989). In general, ASEAN is an organization to promote international cooperation in the economic, social, political, cultural and security. However, for some International Relations scholars, ASEAN was merely one of the mechanisms that the Western world, specifically the United States, has pushed up to fight against the communist expansion and prevent the so-called “Domino Theory” in the region (Djiwanono, 1991).

However, soon after the establishing of ASEAN, the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States has offered the opportunity for the United States to develop a triangle balancing between itself, the Soviet Union, and China. Furthermore, the end of Vietnam War, the diplomatic relations developed between China and the West, and the beginning of the Chinese “Open Policy” had quickly brought the post-Cold War Southeast into the era of free trade, liberal economy, and globalization (Djiwanono, 1991).

With the rapid change of security, as well political and economic environment in the region, From August 1967 until mid-1975, a learning process in which rules governing behavior and norms were formulated into the founding of ASEAN (Leifer, 1989). Simultaneously, the regional “rules of the game”, in which later known as the conceptual basis of the “ASEAN Way”, was established (San, 1999). These rules roughly include: (1) the primacy of political and economic stability in promoting national and regional security; (2) the display of political will to avoid conflicts or disagreements; (3) the primacy of national territorial sovereignty; (4) the primacy of diplomacy in reconciling differing external threat perceptions and accommodation of links to external powers; (5) the preference for bilateral mechanisms in dealing with internal security threats; and (6) finally, the creation of a political formula, or political culture, in which are the fundamental ideology of the “ASEAN Way” to serve the association's existence and purpose (San, 1999).

Finally, as part of the process of shaping its rules of the game, ASEAN began developing “code word” designed to encapsulate common values as well as to accommodate differences. The Indonesian concept of “national resilience” is perhaps the best-known ASEAN code word that later became the building block for the code word “regional resilience” (Antolik, 1990). The concept of national resilience refers to overall national development and an overcoming of internal threats rather than focusing on a defined external threat. And when national resilience is achieved, it will ultimately lead to regional resilience (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982). This idea is used to explain the ASEAN states' bilateral cooperation on several matters, including defense and security.

From the development of ASEAN through such settings, the findings of the study revealed that there is the more suitable approach compared to the other in explaining the security dynamics in the Southeast Asia in each period.

ASEAN 1945-1975: The Balance of Power Approach

Before the end of the Second World War in Asia in August 1945, no regional system of states could be said to have existed in Southeast Asia. Under state-centric perspective, Thailand was the only sovereign “unit”, and therefore the only one capable of pursuing “national interest” as defined by the realist and neorealist. It was until the process of state creation, whether carried out violently or through mutual consent between the colonial power and the dominant

local elites, had begun that a very immature regional system began to take shape. The introduction of the Cold War into Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, saw an increasing American military presence in the region, as well as the advent of a proxy war in combination with a local war in Indochina. However, though the interests of the big powers took precedence, power had its limits, and the US “lost” the war over Indochina. Victory for the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese was celebrated when South Vietnam “fell” under the North in April 1975.

It is useful as a reminder that the very idea of Southeast Asia was an imposed (wartime) external power construct, and that the region’s Cold War strategic value lay in it being an object of external power contests. Regional institutions and local dynamics (except for the powerful nationalism in North Vietnam and Indonesia) were weak and underdeveloped when the Cold War in Southeast Asia began. ASEAN emerged as an institution with the modest objective of sub-regional reconciliation among the maritime Southeast Asian states. Although the grouping included Thailand as a member, in this period it was unable to function as a diplomatic community in support of Thailand. Understandably, Bangkok behaved in the manner balance of power advocates expected, that is, it relied on the United States for its security needs. Even in maritime Southeast Asia, it was the British and Commonwealth forces’ countervailing power that constrained Indonesia’s hegemonic ambitions during the Sukarno period.

The main strength of the balance of power approach in explaining Southeast Asia security dynamic is the fact that states widely use a threat of military force to counterbalance internal and external powers. But in contrast, the balance of power approach failed to explain the beginnings of Southeast Asian regionalism in the late 1960s. As it assumed that states seek either power or military security (against external threats or to fulfill hegemonic ambitions), it failed to take into account the more nuanced security needs and longer-term threat perceptions of some regional states, as well as political leadership and domestic politics. Furthermore, although there was true “self-help” balancing behavior and actions during the Cold War, no central balance of power existed in the Asia-Pacific. If such a balance had existed, it might have drawn Southeast Asia into a wider and even more complicated security arena.

Southeast Asia 1975-1991: The Balance of Power Approach

During this period, as the more mature Southeast Asian regional system developed, important systemic changes occurred. Firstly, American forces were withdrawn from the mainland Southeast Asia region. Secondly, the victory of communist forces has opened the opportunity for the Soviet-backed Vietnamese domination over Indochina, which led to the so-called “Cambodian problem”. Fundamentally, as the resurgent Sino-Soviet rivalry replaced the earlier US-Soviet rivalry, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia triggered a de facto alliance between China and Thailand, and prompted even closer Vietnamese-Soviet collaboration. This “Cambodian problem” thus was seen linking with aggressive Soviet policies elsewhere, including the overall US-Soviet rivalry and other regional contests.

For realists and neorealists, the period 1975-91 in Southeast Asia’s history seemed to be a confirmation of the balance of power’s continuing explanatory power. In this view, regional events were dominated by big power politics. By the late 1980s, it was argued, both the Soviet Union and Vietnam had over-stretched themselves materially, and by 1991 the Americans could dispense with their century-old policy of founding military bases in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia 1975-1991: the Institutional Approach

The institutional approach continues to offer a complementary perspective on events in Southeast Asia in this period. As seen from the institutional perspective, ASEAN regionalism was no longer in its initial phase, consolidation and/or further institution-building were even more evident. On one hand, ASEAN stayed cohesive despite the eruption of several intramural crises. It emerged as a diplomatic community and proved that it could constitute interests on behalf of one of its founding members, Thailand, when it comes to dealing with the Cambodian problem. Generally, ASEAN's goals on the Cambodian issue were limited to diplomatic initiatives, that is, they conformed to the grouping's model of limited regionalism. On the other hand, the requirement of ASEAN members keeping in line with Thailand's foreign policy constrained the preferences of Indonesia and Malaysia, which were wary of forging an anti-Vietnamese coalition with China. In institutional terms, too, Thailand's "turnaround" in 1988 on ASEAN's Indochina policy was a blow to the grouping's solidarity. And, as realists would argue, institutions mattered merely at the margin in the Cambodian issue-resolving, when the major powers decided among themselves that it was in their interests to disengage from the regional conflict.

Southeast Asia 1991-2015: The Balance of Power Approach

From the balance of power perspective, the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific is evolving into a multipolar arena. Southeast Asia, which no longer insulated, became increasingly interdependent with the rest of the Asia-Pacific (in the security and economic spheres). However, while in the earlier bipolar period, the approach has been able to satisfactorily account for the interests and behavior of the major powers, and identified the linkage between the global rivalry and inter-state regional conflicts, the current situation of uncertainty is less clearly explained. In short, during this transition to a more multipolar Asia-Pacific, of which Southeast Asia is now clearly linked to the other constituent parts, balancing behavior has not been strongly manifested.

However, a return to overt balance of power behavior within the region could result from (1) great power rivalry or conflict breaking out in Northeast Asia (Taiwan or Korean peninsula) and spilling over into Southeast Asia (interdiction of sea lanes); or, (2) the regional arms buildup developing into an arms race; or (3) economic interdependence that, instead of creating positive payoffs (mutually beneficial outcomes), creates negative payoffs (zero-sum outcomes).

Southeast Asia 1991-2015: the Institutional Approach

For institutionalists, a region in conflict, especially one with civil war, interstate war, and proxy war, will have weak institutions and difficulty creating new institutions. The evidence from postwar Southeast Asia confirms this observation of the institutional approach. Newly independent regional states had little in common and therefore had great difficulty cooperating on security issues on the basis of a common regional order. The much-troubled process of state-creation in postwar Southeast Asia was thus not conducive to institution creation. Since 1967, however, ASEAN has emerged as a durable example of limited regionalism centered on intergovernmentalism. In addition, after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN and Asia-Pacific has expanded and has seen a resurgence of formal institution creation in both the security and economic arenas. Some prominent examples include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for the former; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum for the latter. ASEAN members have been active in promoting these institutions.

However, an ASEAN-10 was increasingly beset with problems of cohesion, first of all, when Myanmar, who was still a pariah in Western eyes, was accepted into the grouping. With the opposition from the West for Myanmar's inclusion, ASEAN members may once again find

themselves subordinating their own foreign policies to maintain solidarity with Yangon. Secondly, ASEAN should have put a temporary cap on membership after Vietnam's entry in July 1995 and instead prepared Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (the so-called CLM countries) to learn the rules of the game necessary for the ASEAN process to work prior to the joining.

ASEAN 1991-2015: Comprehensive Security

After the Cold War, like developing states in other parts of the world, neorealist perceptions of security remain strong in ASEAN community. Regimes still stress sovereignty, non-interference (enshrined in the “ASEAN Way”), limited cooperation (steered by the governments rather than independent institutions), and mostly defined their security in a conventional way (Caballero-Anthony, 2004). However, at the same time, what makes Southeast Asia different from other developing regions is that it adopted a comprehensive concept of security as early as 1987 (Emmerson, 2008). Comprehensive security trend in ASEAN has broadened security concepts to include a wider range of internal threats to the state and to the well-being, safety, and freedom of its citizens. It is an expanded version of the traditional Realist concept of security, in that it considers threats caused not only by high politics” such as military attacks, but also threats originating from the arena of “low politics”, such as economic issues (Al-Mashat, 1985). Moreover, prior to the very end of the Cold War, ASEAN states have begun to realize that traditional security measures are ill-equipped to deal with issues that have the potential to increase threat, such as poverty, human rights abuse, environmental degradation, illegal immigration, etc. (Emmerson, 2008). And in spite of the distrust among the ASEAN members, ASEAN as an institution has been on the forefront to pursue the notion of comprehensive security which includes conventional as well as nonconventional threats such as underdevelopment, poverty, migration, people and drug trafficking, infectious diseases or environmental degradation.

On one hand, ASEAN leaders have been consistent with the notion of comprehensive security and begun to understand that “security begins at home”; that “we have to be strong on the inside in order to be stronger on the outside” (Al-Mashat, 1985). Domestic matters were thus perceived by ASEAN countries as one of the national security goals, along with political stability, economic well-being, and social harmony (Leifer, 1998). On the other hand, the concept of ASEAN way; particularly the non-interference notion and the territory preserving, is even put ASEAN leaders with the hard choices. Recognizing that they are still vulnerable to both internal conflict and external intervention, most of ASEAN leaders’ responses are multidimensional in that they encompass political, legal, socio-economic, military, and diplomatic measures—and inevitably must include cooperation with other countries for bilateral and multilateral security, as well as cooperation regionally (Alagappa, 1988). Therefore, because of such dilemma to the foster regional cooperation while preserve the notion of ASEAN ways, the concrete collaboration is very limited; usually, it is bi- or minilateral rather than truly regional.

As a response for the notion of security that gradually changing in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Charter, in force since 2008, was progressed into the direction of a more people-oriented understanding of security. The Charter highlights the requirements of sustainable development and the furthering of human development in Southeast Asia with Article 1.7 specifies one of ASEAN’s purposes: “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN” (Gerstl, 2009). Nevertheless, in the Charter, the political dimension of human security is again framed under a neorealist, state-centric perspective. The section “principles” (Art. 2) exemplifies the traditional core principles sovereignty, non-interference into domestic affairs, dialogue and

consensual decision-making (Gerstl, 2009). Besides, nowhere does the Charter acknowledge that human rights are the basis for human development. It merely reiterates the “respect for 66 fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of justice” (Art. 2i) as one of ASEAN’s core principle. The main reason for ASEAN’s wariness in endorsing democracy and human security both on national and regional level is that the majority of the ASEAN countries are authoritarian regimes. The Freedom in the World Index 2008 labels Indonesia as the only “free” democracy in Southeast Asia. The Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are regarded as partly free, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam as not free (Anwar, 2003). It can therefore not be expected that Myanmar or Vietnam advocate democracy and human rights (Ashayagachat, 2009). Until the 15th ASEAN summit in Thailand in October 2009, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), promised since the early 1990s and reiterated in the Charter (Art. 14), has finally been established (Gerstl, 2009).

On this basis, the fact that the ASEAN Charter is still based on sovereignty and noninterference illustrates that ASEAN is not redefining a fundamental principle but rather broadening the notion of security in Southeast Asia (Anwar, 2003). Indeed, this process must be considered as the start rather than the end of the changing notion of security among ASEAN states. Strong impulses for the promotion of human security, notably human rights and democratic values, can only be expected from the increasingly active, transnational organized civil society groups.

CONCLUSION

The study examined the evolving regional security dynamics and the consequent actions and behavior of the various regional states (the ASEAN-10) and involved external powers. In this task, it took into account material factors like power and interests as well as ideational factors like norms, values and identities. The two scholarly approaches were chosen for their insights into how states interact and seek to promote their material interests. The balance of power approach, derived from realist/neorealist theories, set the tone with its compelling argument that, in an anarchic world order, states remain wary of each other and cooperate only because they have to. The institutional approach, derived from neoliberal theories, provided its equally compelling counterpoint argument that cooperation requires rules, and in creating institutions to facilitate these rules, states find that they could cooperate iteratively. Together, these two approaches provide insights into the tensions between conflict and cooperation under anarchy, whether at the systemic or sub-systemic (regional) level. Nevertheless, there are inherent limitations in both approaches in their logical explanation of regional security analysis, especially since the end of the Cold War.

A third idea specifically focused on ASEAN regional security analysis was therefore introduced: the comprehensive security, an analytical device which identifies the often-complicated local dynamics and networking relations in regional systems (and sub-systems) and provides explanatory accounts in situations where the security policies among ASEAN members were diverged. Although the comprehensive security is not an approach as such, for the purpose of this study, the collective expression “the three approaches” has been taken to mean the two approaches deployed, as well as the third idea, the comprehensive security. The comprehensive security, apart from its own merits, can be seen as a supportive idea to the other two. Taken together, all three approaches help to make the understanding of ASEAN regional security more complete

To conclude, under the period of 1975-1991, the balance of power approach identified the development of alignments and alliances among ASEAN members based on power or security. This fuelled the security dilemma and it was found that the behavior of China and

the Soviet Union in the region largely accorded with the assumptions of the balance of power approach: both powers sought to deny the other advantage and both cultivated allies. The regional balance itself saw the revival of Thai-Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese rivalries, and both balances intersected over the Cambodian problem. Thus, the strength of the balance of power approach continued to be in its depiction of the external dynamics. Nevertheless, the approach is weak in identifying the historical and cultural bases of regional dynamics. Besides, it could not explain the behavior of the US which, because of domestic politics and preoccupation with the US-Soviet rivalry elsewhere, played a relatively low-key role in Southeast Asia after 1975.

The institutional approach, on the other hand, identifies the development of cooperative arrangements, both formal and informal, on the basis of prospective mutual gains. Such institutions are strengthened or weakened according to members' expectations. Accordingly, it was found that ASEAN unity was often tenuous but no member was prepared to risk cohesion when put to the test, that is, interests were constituted and constrained. The approach provided the logic (benefits of institutional cooperation) and unity of purpose of ASEAN regionalism on Cambodia despite intramural strategic divergences. Hypothetically, if ASEAN had not existed as a framework to marshal diplomatic support for Thailand on this issue, the Soviet Union and Vietnam would most probably have been able to divide the noncommunist Southeast Asian states, and further fuelled the various rivalries. ASEAN's diplomatic successes were also due to its cohesion. Thus, ASEAN as an institution mattered. However, the institutional approach shares the balance of power approach's weakness in the sense that it emphasizes material interests. Importantly, however, it allows for changing interests, as illustrated in its account of Thailand's "turnaround" on Indochina in 1988 (San, 1999) -- which also indicated that economic interests could be mutually promoted once threat perceptions were considerably ameliorated.

The end of the Cold War not only has resulted in many non-traditional security issues becoming a focus in international relations, but it also set the stage for a comprehensive reevaluation of the whole concept of security. Although the long-held Realist and Neo-realist view has been that the overarching goal of security is the survival of the state, it has become clear that most victims of both traditional and non-traditional security threats are the individual people who live in a given country. The concept of human security acknowledges that basic human needs and human rights, along with social equity--with strong support from the state's governing systems, policies, and laws-- is essential for stability and security at any level of society, from local to global.

Within Southeast Asia, among the ASEAN leaders, the notion of security is gradually changing. Even though the neorealist's notion of state and regime-centric view of security is still dominant, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98 and the natural disasters i.e., tsunami and cyclone Nargis, have further pressured the regimes to adopt a more people-oriented notion of security. The ASEAN Charter in force since 2008, though still based on sovereignty and noninterference, is therefore broadening the concept of security in Southeast Asia. It illustrates the non-traditional security threats such as people, drug and weapon smuggling, organized crime, the spread of mass diseases, terrorism or environmental degradation along with political and military stability. Politically, however, ASEAN has actively tackled nonconventional menaces only in the mid-1990s, starting with drug and people smuggling and terrorism.

Security relations among Southeast Asian states and in their relations with external powers after the Cold War in the future are therefore better examined using the three approaches in a complementary manner. In this way, the influence of local amity/enmity patterns is seen to

impact the balance of power and institutional situations. Similarly, ASEAN evolved from the regional states' understandings of their security interdependence, rather than an unmitigated subscription to the idea of progress in the direction of political and economic integration. Similarly, ASEAN evolved from the regional states' understandings of their security interdependence, rather than an unmitigated subscription to the idea of progress in the direction of political and economic integration. Finally, the inclusion of ideational factors allows for the identification of the inter-subjective process of transforming patterns of amity and enmity relations.

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